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Lawyers' Malpractice In Litigation
Nathaniel Rothstein*
IN THE NEW YORK TIMES of November 28, 1971, appeared the follow-
ing headline: "COMPLAINTS RISE ABOUT LAWYERS". The
news item stated that, according to a report released by the Griev-
ance Committe of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, complaints filed against lawyers in the Boroughs of Man-
hattan and the Bronx jumped 10% in the year's time, bringing the
rate to one complaint for every twelve lawyers. The report further
stated that the volume of complaints by lawyers' clients has been
rising steadily since the end of World War II. Although no satis-
tics are presently available, we know from our own experience that
there is an ever increasing number of attorney-malpractice cases
brought each year, and many of these cases follow the complaints
made by clients to the Bar Association.
Until recently, when we spoke of malpractice we invariably
meant medical malpractice.1 Less than 20 years ago only a handful
of lawyers carried professional liability (malpractice) insurance. This
is no longer true.2 Attorneys who practice in large metropolitan areas
are now keenly aware of the importance and necessity of having
this insurance coverage; and in no segment of the legal profession
is this more urgent than amongst trial lawyers-for much like sur-
geons in the medical field, trial lawyers are the most vulnerable in
attorney-malpractice lawsuits.
Standard of Care
Broadly stated, an attorney is expected to possess and use the
ordinary skill, knowledge and diligence possessed and used by other
members of the legal profession.3 In New York the rule is thus stated:
An attorney who undertakes to represent a client im-
pliedly represents that he possesses a reasonable degree of
skill, that he is familiar with the rules regulating practice
in actions of the type which he undertakes to bring and with
such principles of law in relation to such actions as are well-
settled in the practice of law in the locality where he prac-
tices, and that he will exercise reasonable care .... However,
he is not a guarantor of the result of the case.4
*Of New York City; member of the New York Bar, etc.
1 For example, prior to 1963 the New York Statute of Limitations for malpractice was
held to apply only to the medical profession. Errors by lawyers, accountants, architects,
engineers, etc. were not included. Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
effective September 1, 1963, the limitation period (now 3 years) for actions in mal-
practice was construed to apply to all professionals.
a Rothstein, Trends and Techniques of Malpractice, Vol. 65, No. 22, N.YL.J. (Feb. 2,
1971).
8 The vast majority of attorney-malpractice suits are not based upon the attorney's
lack of knowledge, skill or ability, but rather as a result of the attorney's simple
negligence.
4 Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions, New York Pattern Jury Instructions, § 2:152(A committee of N. Y. Supreme Court Justices).
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The standard of care applicable to lawyers was well stated by a
North Carolina court 5 which held that a lawyer
is answerable in-damages for any loss to his client which
proximately results from a want of that degree of knowledge
and skill ordinarily possessed by others of his profession sim-
ilarly situated, or from the omission to use reasonable care
and diligence, or from the failure to exercise in good faith
his best judgment in attending to the litigation committed
to his care.
There appears to be a dearth of case law with respect to the
standard applicable to a lawyer who holds simself out as a specialist
in some particular branch of law, such as taxes, bankruptcy, negli-
gence, etc. With the ever-increasing trend toward specialization in
the law, it has been urged that an attorney-specialist should be held
to the standard of a specialist in his field rather than that of a general
practitioner,6 and such higher standard makes good legal sense.
Statute of Limitations
We often hear of the "conspiracy of silence' 7 among medical
men, referring to the difficulty in getting a doctor to testify as an
expert witness against a defendant doctor in a medical malpractice
case. Not so with lawyers. They show not the slightest hesitancy
in coming forth to testify to acts of misconduct committed by their
legal brethren. And this is as it should be.
It has been our experience that errors and omissions in litigated
matters give rise to perhaps 80% of all malpractice actions against
lawyers. The pitfalls for the lawyer-litigator are many and deep.
Heading the list is the statute of limitations. Designed as a statute
of repose, this statute has caused attorneys more unrest and uneasy
moments than all other statutes combined, as any lawyer who has
handled a substantial amount of litigated matters will readily testify.
Especially is this so where very short statutes of limitations are
involved, i.e., suits or claims against municipalities or against transit
authorities, or in uninsured motor vehicle cases, or in cases where
the contractss contain extremely limited time periods in which to sue.
The failure to commence a timely action or to present a timely
claim inevitably results in the loss of the client's cause of action, for
which the lawyer is held legally liable in damages. Such failure is
generally prima facie evidence of malpractice by the lawyer-litigator;
but before the plaintiff-client can recover for his lawyer's negligent
conduct he must show that he sustained actual damages, and that
5 Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 at 146 (1954).
6 Kaufman, Problems in Actions Against Attorneys for Malpractice (unpublished 1971);
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 776 (1959); Gardner,
Attorneys' Malpractice, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 264 (1957).
7 Note, Conspiracy of Silence of Medical Profession, 30 NACCA L. J. 93 (1964).
8 Usually found in contracts with banking institutions, insurance companies, railroad
and shipping companies, etc.
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the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of the damages.9
We are now dealing with "a suit within a suit"' 0 and the client must
prove that had the original action been timely commenced and dili-
gently prosecuted, (a) it would probably have been concluded by a
judgment in favor of the client;" (b) that the judgment would have
been for a sum certain;' 2 and (c) that the judgment would have been
collectible.13 All three factors must be established by the plaintiff-
client before he can succeed in the malpractice action against the
defendant-attorney. It is interesting to note that although evidence
as to a defendant's insurance policy is generally not permitted in a
negligence action, such evidence may be introduced in an attorney-
malpractice case on the issue of collectibiity of the judgment, if
that issue is raised.14
Another nice problem arises with respect to the malpractice
statute of limitations. When does a cause of action in attorney-mal-
practice accrue? Normally, it would accrue when the client suffers
any damage as a result of his attorney's error. Sometimes, however,
the client does not become aware of his lawyer's negligent conduct
until much later, and by the time he learns of the loss of his original
cause of action the malpractice statute of limitations may have run
against him and time-bar his action.
This brings about a harsh and certainly inequitable result to an
innocent client. The courts first wrestled with this problem in medical
malpractice cases where the client was unaware of his doctor's mis-
take until after the limitation period in which to sue had expired.
Thus was born the "continuous treatment" principle under which
the courts held that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice
cases did not accrue until the date when the physician last treated
the client for his illness.15
This continuous treatment theory was recently adopted by a
New York court in an attorney-malpractice suit, 16 again to avoid
the obvious unfairness of the general rule that the cause accrues
when the lawyer's error is committed. In that case the attorney
neglected to file a timely claim for uninsured motorists' coverage
in behalf of his client. However, the issue of untimeliness was liti-
9 Piper v. Green, 216 IIl.App.590 at 592 (Ct.App. 1920).
10 Coggin, Attorney Negligence-A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225 (1958).
11 Piper v. Green, 216 Ill.App.590 at 592; Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57 (Mun. App. D.C.
1949); General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.
2d 155 (1950) ; Johnson v. Haskins, 119 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Lamprecht
v. Bien, 125 App. Div. 811, 110 N.Y.S. 128 (1908).
12 W. L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
18 Piper v. Green, 216 Il1.App.590 at 592 (1920) ; Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63
(E.D. Tenn. 1966).
14 Hammons v. Schrunk, 209 Ore. 127, 305 P.2d 405 (1956).
15 Thatcher v. DeTar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) ; Hammer v. Rosen, 7
N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756 (1960) ; Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d
944 (1942).
e Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968).
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gated vigorously and over a long period of time by the attorney in
behalf of his client, in an attempt to save the client's cause of action.
Ultimately, he lost. By this time some six years had elapsed since
his neglect to give timely notice.
When the client brought suit against his former lawyer for mal-
practice, the attorney-defendant raised the malpractice statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense, and promptly moved to dismiss
the complaint. The court at Special Term granted the motion, holding
the action to be time-barred. On appeal, however, the court reversed,
likening this case to the situation where a physician continued to
treat his patient, thereby extending the accrual date of the statute
of limitations from the date of the last treatment. Said the appellate
court, in part:
The fairness of applying the "continuous treatment" doc-
trine to the attorney-client relationship is strikingly demon-
strated in this appeal. The negligence which the plaintiffs
assert could not come to light until the conclusion of that
litigation, that is, when the permanent stay of arbitration
resulted because of the late service of the notice of claim.
Surely it would be premature and even presumptuous of the
plaintiffs to institute an action against the defendant prior to
the definitive determination through the process of the court
of the defect in complying with the statutory mandates.
We note, too, that a contrary rule concerning the accrual
of a cause of action against an attorney for malpractice in the
management of litigation might well lead to procrastination
by the attorney to postpone the inevitable event of defeat.
The author of the disaster should not be enabled to chart the
strategy to avoid the liability for his own negligence. Other-
wise, negligence could be disguised by the device of delay,
and an attorney rewarded by immunity from the consequence
of his negligence.
This is a well-reasoned decision and we would expect other
jurisdictions who have adopted the "continuous treatment" principle
in medical cases to apply it equally in actions against lawyers. It
gives the client or patient a greater degree of protection against
the delinquent attorney or physician.
With its usual forward looking view, California, among others,
has taken an even more acceptable position on the question of
accrual date in attorney-malpractice cases. It has adopted the "dis-
covery" rule, thus holding that where the client is unaware of his
attorney's error, the starting date of the statute of limitations is the
date of discovery or the date when the client in the exercise of due
diligence, should have discovered the lawyer's negligent act.17 A
giant step forward, indeed.
16a Id. at 815.
0 Neel v. Mangana, 14 Cal. App.3d 813, Cal. Rptr. 814 (1971) ; Mumford v. Staton,
254 Md. 697, 255 A-2d 359 (1969).
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We would like to see some uniformity in malpractice statutes of
limitation throughout the country. There should be a limitation
period set specifically for malpractice actions. Also, a plaintiff should
have a reasonable opportunity to discover the professional's error.
In our opinion, a model malpractice statute would have a limitation
period of two to three years from the date of damage or injury to
the plaintiff with the proviso that if the cause of action is not dis-
covered and could not reasonably have been discovered in such
period, the action may be commenced within six months from the
date of discovery, and further provided that in no event may such
action be commenced later than five years from the date the damage
or injury was sustained.
Damages
If the plaintiff-client is successful in proving that his original
cause of action was valid and would have resulted in a judgment in
his favor, his measure of damages is the amount that he would have
recovered in the original action.18 Let us assume, for example, that
the client had a valid cause of action in negligence against a prospec-
tive defendant, and that had the attorney properly handled the plain-
tiff's case he would have recovered a judgment of $10,000. Out of
this sum, the attorney would have received a fee of perhaps 33-1/3%
for his services, leaving the client with a net recovery of only $6,667.
In this country, unlike in England, we do not reimburse success-
ful plaintiffs for their out-of-pocket expenses incurred in bringing
a lawsuit. Moneys spent for attorneys' fees, investigative work, prep-
aration of exhibits, etc., are not taxable as costs except in certain
cases where a special statute specifically allows them to be so taxed.
The plaintiff who sues his debtor for the repayment of a $10,000
loan may recover a judgment in said amount but he is out-of-pocket
monies spent for legal fees, so that his net recovery will be less than
the amount of the judgment.
In the negligence case referred to above, the plaintiff-client's
damages would have been $6,667 of the suit were brought in New
York,' 9 and $10,000 if the action were in California.20
Where the litigant is a defendant and his attorney negligently
fails to plead and prove a valid defense which would have completely
defeated plaintiff's cause of action, the attorney is responsible for the
loss of the case. Thus, if the statute of limitations were a complete
bar to an action, or if the statute of frauds were a valid defense, or
if the defense of illegality could have been successfully interposed
in a contract case, etc., the attorney's failure to set up such proper
18 Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905).
19 Childs v. Comstock, 69 App. Div. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902).
20 Benard v. Stern, 272 Cal. App.2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969).
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defense to defeat the plaintiff's claim, is malpractice. 21 In such case,
the plaintiff-client's damages in an action against his attorney would
be the total amount that the client was compelled to pay to the
plaintiff under the judgment in the original action.
In the handling of a plaintiff's lawsuit, the attorney inevitably
becomes involved in settlement negotiations. It behooves the attor-
ney to keep his client fully advised as to the status of such negotia-
tions, as well as to the attorney's evaluation of liability and damages
so that the client may be able to make an informed decision whether
to accept or reject a particular offer.22 If the attorney representing
a plaintiff fails to inform his client of a pending offer and thereby
forecloses the client's opportunity to accept such offer, the lawyer
will undoubtedly be held liable for damages in the amount of said
offer where the case is ultimately lost after trial. Similarly, if in
representing a defendant the attorney has received a demand from
plaintiff's attorney so that he knows the case can be settled for a
certain limited sum, he is duty bound to make full disclosure of same
to the client, thus giving his client the option of settling the lawsuit.
Failure to pass on this information to the client may render the attor-
ney liable in damages if there is a subsequent recovery in excess of
the proposed settlement figure.23 Nor may an attorney settle his
client's case without first obtaining the client's consent to such
settlement.24
Where a lawyer undertakes to represent a client in litigation and
commences an action in his behalf, he may not unilaterally withdraw
from such case without the court's consent. Should he step out of
the case at a critical juncture, he will be liable in damages to his
client for abandonment.2 5
Failure To Take An Appeal
Statutes throughout the country uniformly require an appeal to
be filed within a relatively short time, usually 30 days after the ap-
pellant is served with a copy of the order or judgment with a notice
reciting that said order or judgment has been entered by the clerk.
Far too often does counsel for the appellant fail to file his appeal
within the prescribed time limit. Sometimes, too, the attorney files
a timely appeal and later finds himself confronted with a motion to
dismiss the appeal for lack of diligent prosecution.
21 Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57 (Mun. App. D.C. 1949); Utterback-Gleason v. Standard
Accident & Ind. Co., 193 App. Div. 646, 184 N.Y.S. 862, 135 N.E. 913 (1920).
2 This is much like the doctrine of "informed consent" in medical malpractice law,
Rothstein, Supra note 2.
23 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App.2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, (1908) (excess verdict of
$225,000).
24 Kreling v. Walsh, 77 Cal. 821, 176 P.2d 965 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); In re Cusimano,
174 Misc. 1068, 22 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
25 Perkins v. Sykes, 63 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Howard v. McCarson, 215
Ala. 251, 110 Sn.2d 296 (1926).
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We have seen many cases where counsel for the appellant, prior
to recommending and obtaining the client's consent to the filing of
an appeal, informs his client in no uncertain terms that the lower
court committed reversible error in arriving at the order or judgment.
Having thus stirred up new hope in the client's breast and then
having failed to bring on the appeal before the appellate court, is it
any wonder that the client turns against his delinquent lawyer and
sues him in malpractice! In these circumstances where the attorney
has already given strong assurances of a reversal, what defense can
be set up when charged by his former client with failure to take a
timely appeal?
Clearly, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is negligent
conduct since an attorney is charged with knowledge of proper
appellate practice and procedure. 26 However, such negligence does
not doom the attorney's defense in the malpractice suit. The fact that
the attorney advised his client that he believed the order or judg-
ment would be reversed on appeal is neither material nor relevant.
The only issue in such case is whether there would have been a reversal
had the appeal been taken and brought befor-e the appellate court.27 And this
issue is solely one of law to be decided by the trial court who is now
sitting, in effect, as an appellate court.28
In McAlleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. 29 the attor-
ney for the plaintiff's insurance company neglected to prosecute an
appeal from a judgment against plaintiff after having assured him
that an appeal would be taken because the record was "infected with
error". As a result, plaintiff was compelled to pay the judgment
in full, whereas he could have settled it for a considerably lesser
sum. Plaintiff then sued the insurance carrier, as employer of the
attorney, based upon the attorney's negligence in failing to follow
through with the appeal. New York's highest appellate court held
that merely because the defendant failed to take an appeal did not
render it liable in damages to the plaintiff; the plaintiff would first
have to establish that had the appeal been taken, it would have been
successful and there would have been a reversal of the judgment.
The Court of Appeals stated, in part:
It is a fundamental rule that one seeking to hold another
liable for neglect to perform some duty or obligation must
show that the neglect has resulted in some loss or injury,
and that as the result thereof certain damages have been
suffered. While there seem to be some not very impressive
expressions to the contrary (Godefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413;
Wharton on Neg. § 752), the great majority of authorities in
28 Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM L. REV. 1295 (1963).
27 General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.2d 155
(1950) ; Pete v. Henderson 124 Cal. App.2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954) ; Sutton v. Whiteside, 101 Okla. 74, 222 P.2d 974 (1924).
28 Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App.2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
29 McAlleenan v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 232 N.Y. 199, 133 N.E. 444 (1921).
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this and other jurisdictions apply this rule to such an action
as the present one and decide directly or indirectly, that one
who seeks to hold another responsible for neglect in the con-
duct of litigation must show that the action which has been
neglected would probably have been successful, and therefore
that its neglect has directly resulted in damages measured by
the value or amount of the rights which were lost by the
default.
The agreement only extended to the consummation of the
appeal and its proper prosecution. It did not guarantee
success. It ought to be a matter of common knowledge that
an agreement to prosecute an appeal is not equivalent to a
warranty that the appeal will succeed.
Exercise of Judgment
During litigation an attorney is required to make decisions from
time to time as to the tactics or strategy he shall employ in represent-
ing the client's cause. Whether to move against a defective but
correctable pleading, whether to seek an examination before trial
of an adverse party or of other witnesses, whether to take the deposi-
tion of one's own client to perpetuate his testimony for trial because
of age or possible illness-these and other questions constantly arise
in the course of litigation. It is for the attorney to make the decision
whether the motion or proceeding should or should not be held.
Since this is purely a matter of judgment, the attorney will not be
held liable for any error in judgment. This same rule would apply
to actual trial procedure, i.e., deciding how many witnesses shall be
called, the order of presenting the witnesses, waiver of right to cross
examination, etc. And where the state of the law is unsettled or suffi-
ciently doubtful so that knowledgeable attorneys would disagree as
to what the law is, an attorney will not be responsible if it should
ultimately be determined that his legal opinion was not correct.3 0
Tort or Contract
The threshold question in an attorney-malpractice suit often is
whether the cause of action is in tort or in contract, or in a twilight
zone between the two.3 ' In some jurisdictions there is a specific mal-
practice statute in which case the statute defines the time in which
such action may be brought.3 2 However, absent a special malpractice
statute of limitations, the question as to the nature of the cause
against the attorney-defendant may well determine whether or not
the action is time-barred.
30 Wade, The Attorney', Liability For Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959); Citi-
zens' Loan, Fund, & Say. Ass'n. v. Friendly, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890) ; Rapuzzi
v. Stetson, 160 App. Div. 150, 145 N.Y.S. 455 (1914) ; Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C.
517, 80 S.E.2d 144 at 146. This would be an issue for the court to decide, it being
purely a question of law.
31 The courts throughout the country are not in agreement as to the nature of a cause
of action in malpractice. Supra note 26.
32 Several states with special malpractice statutes do not permit contract actions, i.e.,
Minnesota, Kentucky, Colorado, Missouri, Ohio. Contra, Michigan
May 1972
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Normally, the tort limitation period is considerably shorter than
in contract, and if this shorter statute has already run the client will
surely seek to sue in contract so as to stay in court with his mal-
practice lawsuit. In such case, he will claim that the defendant-lawyer
failed to use the skill and diligence usually possessed and used by
other members of the legal profession, thus breaching his contract
of retainer. Whether an attorney-malpractice suit may be brought
for breach of contract where the gravamen of the cause of action is
in negligence, will depend upon the case law in the particular juris-
diction. New York has held, and we think properly, that the tort
and not the contract limitation should apply in attorney-malpractice
cases.33 However, there is an exception to this rule: where the
complaint charges that the defendant-attorney guaranteed a specific
result, such as promising to win the case or assuring the client he
would recover a specified minimum amount, a cause of action for
breach of contract will lie against the attorney.34 Needless to say,
the plaintiff-client must prove such guarantee at the trial, in default
of which he cannot recover. Where breach of contract is established,
the defendant-attorney will be liable in damages to the client regard-
less of how skillful or how knowledgeable or how diligent he was
in handling the client's litigation. In a breach of contract suit, the
attorney's skill or diligence is irrelevant, because this is not a true
malpractice cause of action.
Actions Against Attorney By Third Party
May a creditor of the litigant bring a malpractice suit against
the litigant's attorney on the theory that if the attorney had properly
handled the lawsuit a recovery would have been had so as to enable
the creditor to satisfy his claim against the litigant? The New York
rule is that a third party, such as a creditor, may not hold the attor-
ney liable in simple negligence; he must establish that the attorney's
conduct was fraudulent, collusive, malicious or tortious, in order to
recover.3 5
New York authorities do not extend liability to an attor-
ney whose negligence may bring harm to a third party with
whom he has no privity provided the charge is simple negli-
gence. An attorney is not liable to a third party for acts
performed in good faith and mere negligence on the part of the
attorney is insufficient to give a cause of action to the injured
third party. He is liable to a third party only when he is guilty
of fraud or collusion or of a malicious or tortious act (3 N. Y.
3S Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 3 App. Div.2d 686, 159 N.Y..2d 95 (1957) ; Contra,
Benard v, Stern, 272 Cal.App.2d 595, 77 Cal.Rptr.544 (Ct. App. 1969).
34 Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 9 App. Div. 2d 686, 159 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1957).
35 Maneri v. Amodeo, 38 Misc.2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup.Ct.1963). The cases which
permit a third party to hold liable an attorney are cases which invariably stem from
faulty will drafting. Where a devisee under a will loses all or part of the bequest
given in the will, his cause against the attorney-draftsman is actually based upon
the well established third party beneficiary doctrine which has long been accepted
as an exception to the privity rule.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R (2)
Jur., Attorney and Client, § 52b; in re Cushman, 95 Misc. 9, 160
N.Y.S. 661; Dallas v. Fassnacht, 42 N.Y.S.2d 415).
There is, in the court's opinion, no reason to extend the
liability of an attorney as presently defined under the New
York rule and since the complaint makes no allegation of
fraud, collusion or of a malicious or tortious act, the complaint
can not be sustained. (Emphasis added)
In this age of specialization we find lawyers referring actions
to trial or associate counsel for handling. The Canons of Ethics re-
quire that referring counsel participate in the legal work to be en-
titled to a share in the legal fee. Aside from the ethical aspects of
this arrangement, it is important for referring counsel to oversee
(not overlook) the work of his trial counsel so that he may be kept
advised at all times as to the status of the case. He should make cer-
tain that the summons and complaint are timely served, even though
that task may have been assigned to trial counsel. Also, he should
check the pleadings and follow the case as it progresses to see that
it is not dismissed for unreasonable delay in prosecution. He owes
this minimum obligation to the client who hired him, and this obli-
gation survives the transfer of the case for handling by other counsel.
We might note, parenthetically, that where there has been a
failure to make timely service of the summons, or where the action
has been dismissed for want of prosecution, a malpractice action will
usually be brought against both the original counsel retained by the
plaintiff as well as trial counsel subsequently brought into the case.
If, for example, the cause of action was lost because of failure to
make timely service of the summons, and if the duty of preparing
and serving such summons had been assigned to trial counsel, both
counsel may be held liable to the client. However, as between the
lawyer originally retained by the client and trial counsel subse-
quently retained by the lawyer, it would seem that trial counsel
would be guilty of active negligence and referring counsel guilty of
passive negligence, thus enabling the latter to crossclaim against and
seek common law indemnification from trial counsel. On the other
hand, if the agreement between counsel was that the referring attor-
ney would cause the summons to be prepared and served, no liability
would attach to trial counsel. The same principles would apply to a
client's cause of action which had been lost because of failure to
prosecute. Normally, it would be trial counsel's obligation to move the
case along without delay, and although both counsel would be liable
in malpractice to the client, trial counsel, as the active tortfeasor,
would be answerable to the referring attorney.
Dismissal For Lack of Prosecution
Many attorney-malpractice cases result in defendants' verdicts
not because the trial judge or jury is unduly sympathetic toward the
defendant-attorney. On the contrary, the sympathy generally lies in
favor of the plaintiff-client who through no fault of his own has
May 1972
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been deprived of his cause of action without a trial. These defendants'
verdicts occur because the underlying cause of action is often one of
such very doubtful liability that the lawyer tends to neglect to com-
mence a timely suit for the client. This may be because after having
accepted the case he belatedly comes to the realization that, at best,
he has an extremely difficult case to prove; and he does not relish
the thought of spending considerable time, effort, and expense on
such a case where the prospect of winning is heavily weighted
against him.
This same case of doubtful liability, once having been started
within the statutory period, often "gets lost" for similar reasons, as a
result of which the case may be dismissed by the court for lack of
diligent prosecution. Rarely does a defendant's attorney move to
dismiss a case for lack of prosecution until he knows that a dismissal
will result in a second action for the same relief being time-barred.
In New York, we had a flood of such malpractice actions against
lawyers when in December 1963, an appellate court laid down strict
guidelines for the lower courts to follow in deciding motions to dis-
miss for lack of diligent prosecution. 6 The court noted that,
There is an intimate relationship between the merit of
an action and the fact that it has been neglected.
The result was the dismissal of scores of pending lawsuits and
many members of the legal profession "got caught". A large number
of attorney-malpractice cases was the inevitable result. This decision
ultimately resulted in the enactment of a new civil practice rule
which required that a plaintiff's attorney be served with a 45-day
notice to calendar his case before defendant's counsel was permitted
to move to dismiss the action for lack of prosecution. A similar 45-
day rule should be a "must" in every jurisdiction in the country.
So, too, fair warning should be given to plaintiff's lawyer before
the court proceeds to dismiss a case on its own motion, especially
since defendant's counsel, too, is equally responsible for trial delays,
but no similar punishment is meted out to him. The New York 45-day
rule gives the plaintiff's attorney the needed protection.
The resulting injustice to litigants who lose their day in court
because of procedural difficulties was denounced by the late Supreme
Court Justice Black in the following language:
I find it inconsistent with a fair system of justice to throw
out a litigant's case because his lawyer, due to negligence,
or misunderstanding, or some other reason, fails to satisfy
one of many procedural time limits. If a pound of flesh is
required because of negligence of a lawyer, why not impose
the penalty on him and not his innocent client?3 7
86 Sortino v. Fisher, 20 App.Div.2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup.Ct.App.Div. 1963).
37 Pittsburgh Towing Co. v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 385 U.S. .32, 87 S.Ct.
195 (1966).
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Of course, the ultimate penalty is imposed upon the lawyer and
not upon the client who now has a remedy via an attorney-malprac-
tice action.
In Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.3 8 the plaintiff sustained personal
injuries at a railroad crossing. His complaint was filed by his attor-
ney in a Federal District in Indiana on August 24, 1954 and the
defendant-railroad company filed an answer to the complaint shortly
thereafter. The defendant then moved about seven months later for
judgment on the pleadings and the motion was not argued until
October 18, 1955. On November 30, 1955, defendant's motion was
granted and plaintiff appealed. In October, 1956, the Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court. On February 25, 1957, certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court.
At this posture, the case had been delayed 2-1/2 years by an er-
roneous ruling of the lower court, made upon defendant's applica-
tion. The case was then remanded for trial for July 17, 1957. On June
17, a month before the scheduled trial date plaintiff moved to vacate
the trial date with defendant's consent. On March 25, 1959 there was a
hearing on the court's own motion to determine if the case should
be dismissed. This resulted in a new trial date set for July 15, 1959.
This time the defendant moved to vacate the trial date with the
plantiff consenting. On March 11, 1960, defendant filed additional
interrogatories and the plaintiff filed answers thereto within 45 days.
Finally, on September 29, 1960, the court noticed both sides to attend
a pretrial conference on October 12, 1960 at 1:00 P.M.
On October 11, plaintiff's counsel had business in a state court
about 160 miles away, and on the morning of October 12 he tele-
phoned long distance to the district judge to tell him that he was
about four hours away, and to request an adjournment of the pre-
trial conference until the following day. The judge's secretary who
answered the phone, said he would relay the attorney's request to
the judge who was then on the bench. The district judge, apparently
annoyed because this case had been on the calendar for six years
(although more than half of the delay was surely attributable to
defendant's counsel) dismissed the case that very day without
further notice stating:
Pursuant to the inherent powers of the court, and upon
failure of plaintiff's counsel to appear at a pre-trial, which
was scheduled for today, October 12, 1960, at 1:00 o'clock,
pursuant to notice, under Rule 12, counsel having failed to
give any good and sufficient reason for not appearing at said
pre-trial, the cause is now dismissed.
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
It was affirmed two to one with the dissenting judge stating:
88 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
39 Link v. Wabash R.R., 291 F.2d 542, at 543 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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The order now affirmed has inflicted a serious injury
upon an injured man and his family, who are innocent of any
wrongdoing. Plaintiff's cause of action.., was his property.
It has been destroyed. The district court, to punish a lawyer,
has confiscated another's property without process of law,
which offends the constitution. A district court does not lack
disciplinary authority over an attorney and there is no justi-
fication, moral or legal, for its punishment of an innocent
litigant for the personal conduct of his counsel. Because it
was neither necessary nor proper to visit the sin of the lawyer
upon his client, I would reverse.
40
Further appeal was entertained by the Supreme Court of the
United States, an dthere it was affirmed four to three! Justice Black's
vigorous dissent which reviewed the facts in detail, ended with:
It may not be of much importance to anyone other than
the plaintiff here and his family whether this case is tried on
its merits or not. To my mind, however, it is of very great
importance to everyone in this country that we do not estab-
lish the practice of throwing litigants out of court without
notice to them solely because they are credulous enough to
entrust their cases to lawyers whose names are accredited
as worthy and capable by their government. I fear that this
case is not likely to stand out in the future as the best
example of American justice. 41
Let this case stand as a caveat to attorneys who may be tempted
to deal lightly with pre-trial proceedings! Our highest court has
spoken, although one may hope that this is not its final word on the
subject. Attorneys who carry on a substantial litigation practice in
a large city are particularly vulnerable due to the multitudinous
calendars and the heavy demands of pretrial proceedings. What
with calendar calls for pretrial conferences, reserve calendars, special
calendars, and ready day calendars which require attorneys to be
personally present in court, one wonders how a single practitioner
manages to have so few cases dismissed.
Conclusion
As has been stated, an attorney malpractice case is a suit within
a suit. Recently we handled an unusual case. It was a suit within a
suit within a suit. This occurred where the plaintiff sustained per-
sonal injuries allegedly due to medical malpractice. Plaintiff then
hired a prominent negligence attorney to prosecute her action against
the doctor. Due to an inadvertent calendar dismissal of the action,
plaintiff lost her remedy against the doctor. She promptly retained
another attorney to bring an action in malpractice against her former
attorney. This second suit resulted in a settlement with the consent
and approval of the client. Some time later our litigious client decided
that her second attorney had not disclosed the full facts to her, and
40 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, at 637 (1962).
41 Id. Justices Warren and Douglas joined in the dissent, two other justices not voting.
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that she would not have settled the case against her former lawyer
had she been properly advised. Thereupon she engaged a third lawyer
to sue the second lawyer for having settled with the first lawyer
whose case against the negligent doctor had been inadvertently dis-
missed. This last action was ultimately dismissed for legal insuffi-
ciency. We never ascertained whether plaintiff ever sued her third
lawyer.
Perhaps the best thing an attorney can do to avoid these pitfalls
is to make a periodic check of each and every file in his office, and
ascertain that no plaintiff's case is lying dormant. A lawyer's mal-
practice policy is not a bad thing to have, either.
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